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CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND SPECIAL INTERESTS: 
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. By 
Kennan L. Teslik. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1982. Pp. 
ix, 280. $29.95. 
If one were given a list that included Xerox Corporation, Paul 
Newman and Disney's "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs," it 
would be a challenge to identify the common element. The solution 
is that these were among the two thousand entities that were black-
listed by the Arab League because they made a "material contribu-
tion" to Israel. 1 The boycott, which began even before Israel's 
establishment as a state, divided the Middle East's trading partners 
into those who trade with Arab countries and those who are black-
listed. For example, a person in an Arab country can drive a Chevy 
from National Car Rental but not one from Hertz; in Saudi Arabia, 
one can buy Pepsi but never Coke. In contrast to the erratic opera-
tion of the Arab boycott, Kennan Teslik's2 Congress, The Executive 
Branch, and Special Interests presents a coherent narrative of the 
calculated efforts to establish anti-boycott legislation in this country.3 
Teslik's theme is that, through a unique combination of factors, the 
anti-boycott legislation achieved the principal goals of the anti-boy-
cott activists without seriously damaging America's growing interests 
in the Arab world. In Teslik's book, the how and why of the 1977 
Anti-Boycott Amendments to the Export Administration Act of 
19694 are nicely placed in the context of domestic politics and inter-
national events. 
The Arab oil embargo was the first major event that led to grow-
ing pressure for governmental action from many sectors in Israel and 
the United States. The increased influence of the Arab countries 
changed the world's perception of the boycott. What had once been 
thought of as a "toothless and gutless" propaganda device was now 
seen as a mechanism designed to attach strings to petrodollars in 
order to force the West to diminish its links with Israel (p. 69). In-
1. "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" was included in the boycott because the Prince's 
horse was named Samson. 
2. The author received his Ph.D. from Oxford in 1981. He has worked as a private con-
sultant and as a foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Treasury Department. 
3. R. HOWE & s. TROTT, THE POWER PEDDLERS (1977) also contains an analysis of the 
formulation of measures against the boycott. See also The Arab Boycott and the International 
Response, 8 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 527 (1978) (entire issue devoted to the impact of the 
legislation). For a book that advocates a response to the boycott and that was written before 
the passage of the Anti-Boycott Amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1969, see D. 
CHILL, THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL: ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND WORLD REACTION 
(1976). 
4. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (Supp. V 1981) (originally the 
1977 Export Administration Amendments, terminated Sept. 30, 1979 without substantial 
change). 
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deed, Teslik attributes the Ford administration's failure to combat 
the boycott to the fear that strong opposition would jeopardize the 
nation's access to oil (p. 107). Nevertheless, Teslik overlooks the 
connection between this dependence-compelled acquiescence and 
the emerging public resentment of Arab policies. 
The media fanned this growing apprehension about Arab power 
into a call for action by publicizing the "shadow boycott." This self-
enforced voluntary boycott of firms and persons thought to be unde-
sirable to the Arabs resulted, to an unascertained degree, in discrimi-
nation against Jewish Americans. The Jewish lobby, and later the 
Carter administration, emphasized the moral aspect of combatting 
the boycott. The battle was characterized as a struggle that pitted 
United States' sovereignty and the principle of nondiscrimination 
against the evil of the oil countries and the greed of big business. 
The Bank Scandal of 1975 added more force to the warnings of 
Jewish organizations and aided their efforts to combat the boycott. 
Certain banks, primarily in London and Paris, discovered that they 
had been excluded from Eurobond underwriting because of Arab 
pressure. The media reported the boycott's influence on investment 
banking as a new development in Arab economic warfare, and con-
gressional hearings were soon conducted to investigate the discrimi-
natory aspects of the boycott. These hearings gave officials of Jewish 
organizations an opportunity to express their concerns before Con-
gress and the attendant press and shifted the focus of the controversy 
from international events to the domestic political arena. 
The .Ford administration had preferred quiet diplomacy to the 
confrontation inherent in passing and implementing a new statute. It 
believed that the potential costs of new legislation would include: 
(1) injury to diplomatic efforts in the Middle East; (2) damage to 
Arab-American trade; and (3) public hypocrisy, in light of the Amer-
ican proclivity to adopt politically-motivated trade controls. But 
anti-boycott bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House 
in 1975, and, by the time of President Carter's election, the tenor of 
these bills made it clear that anti-boycott legislation in some form 
would be approved by Congress. The Carter administration took a 
more receptive stance than its predecessor by accepting the basic 
thrust of congressional anti-boycott initiatives. Yet the administra-
tion largely settled for public statements of support; it did not formu-
late any specific policies. 
Later events are what provided Teslik with the opportunity to 
distinguish his discussion of the role that interest groups played in 
the formation of this legislation from the increasing volume of litera-
ture on lobbyists.5 In the face of the executive branch's near abdica-
5. See, e.g., R. HOWE & s. TROIT, supra note 3; N. ORNSTEIN & s. ELDER, INTEREST 
GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING (1978). Lobbying is not, of course, a modem phe-
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tion of responsibility, representatives of American business and 
Jewish organizations took responsibility for resolving the issue. Ir-
ving Shapiro of the Business Roundtable (BR) approached the lead-
ership of the Anti-Defamation League (AOL) of B'nai B'rith, and 
the partnership formed by that meeting negotiated and drafted the 
Joint Statements of Principles, which ultimately became the 1977 
Amendments to the Export Administration Act. President Carter 
did little more than establish a climate receptive to the product of the 
negotiations between the BR and the Jewish organizations, of which 
the ADL was the most influential. 
Teslik provides both background information about and an anal-
ysis of the roles of these private drafting groups. The Business 
Roundtable was formed in 1972 and is composed of the chief execu-
tives of 170 major American corporations. The keys to its influence 
are the direct participation of the chief executives and the use of 
member corporate resources on an ad hoc basis. In drafting the leg-
islation, the BR focused political tensions on itself and afforded the 
executive branch the luxury of remaining in the background. The 
Israeli lobby generally operates on three levels: the diplomatic activ-
ity of the government itself, the pro-Israel activities of American 
Jewish organizations, and the sentiment of Jewish Americans. The 
Anti-Defamation League is dedicated to eliminating anti-Jewish dis-
crimination from American life and was BR's major partner in draft-
ing the legislation. In a tactical move, the strongest Israeli lobby, the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), kept a low pro-
file in order to portray the boycott as an American domestic 
problem. 
The measures formulated by these private groups were adopted 
verbatim by Congress. The legislation is basically a prohibition on 
taking action to comply with, further, or support a foreign boycott 
including: (I) discriminating against a United States citizen because 
of race, religion, sex, ethnic or national origin, and (2) furnishing 
information about such characteristics or about a person's activities 
with, or contributions to, a boycotted country. Teslik applauds the 
legislation as a compromise from which everyone gained something. 
The new law reconfirmed American support for Israel, and although 
the majority of the business community would have preferred no 
legislation at all, the final act was not a major impediment to Arab-
American trade. Both the Carter administration and Congress 
scored some points politically while avoiding an all-out 
confrontation. 
nomenon; Teslik notes that it is the world's second oldest profession: "'Who convinced Hanni-
bal to buy all those elephants?' . . . 'Why did the Romans go in so heavily for road 
construction? What is the Sphinx doing so far out in the desert?'" P. 245 (quoting the letter of 
a New Hampshire assemblywoman to The Boston Globe). 
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This alternative legislative path succeeded - at least insofar as it 
satisfied the Jewish lobbyists and did not compromise American ac-
cess to oil - due to a fortuitous union of factors. President Carter's 
desire to avoid a major battle before the public initially opened the 
way for the private interest groups. A number of committed and 
influential individuals kept the process moving, and the participating 
groups' recognition of the necessity for compromise paved the way 
to a resolution of the issue. The quality of the substantive provisions 
benefited from the internal capabilities of the BR and ADL as well 
as from each group's ability to speak authoritatively for a commu-
nity whose interests would be significantly affected. Teslik traces 
this process nicely but fails to ask whether a combination of special 
interest groups will ever again have the opportunity to formulate 
American policy unilaterally. His general concern that powerful 
lobbyists may distort public policy is far more compelling in this 
type of situation, in which the traditional countervailing pressures 
exerted by Congress and the Executive branch are absent. Still, the 
reader is left to speculate on how - or even if - such a situation 
will arise in the future. 
Teslik's discomfort with the prominent role played by the Israeli 
lobby in drafting the Amendments weakens his otherwise balanced 
analysis, and his attempt to contrast the relative strength of the Is-
raeli lobby with that of the Arab lobby is undermined by simplistic 
statements. For instance, Teslik writes that "if a foreign government 
wants favorable treatment in Washington there is nothing like a do-
mestic mouthpiece with political clout. Israel has one. The Arabs 
don't" (p. 46). But this statement is preceded by a discussion of Arab 
nations' employment of well-connected Americans (including Clark 
Clifford and William Fulbright) to look after Arab interests,6 and a 
discussion of the growth of the National Association of Arab Ameri-
cans (NAAA). Teslik's oversimplification also ignores the promi-
nent role played throughout the 1970's by companies such as 
Aramco and Standard Oil as representatives of the Arab interests,' 
and he further ignores the then-prevalent sympathetic image of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization. The glaring imbalance of this 
section leads the reader to question the accuracy of Teslik's other 
portraits. 
William Quandt once described foreign policymaking discourag-
ingly as follows: 
The process by which foreign decisions are made is complex and often 
perplexing, not only to outside observers but also to the participants 
6. On the influence of the Arab lobby generally, see A.K. GooTT & S. ROSEN, THE CAM· 
PAIGN TO DISCREDIT ISRAEL (1983); H. LEVINS, ARAB REACH: THE SECRET WAR AGAINST 
ISRAEL (1983). 
7. For a more critical discussion of Arab influence, see W. NELSON & T. PRITTIE, THE 
ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (1977). 
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themselves. When this awkward process, dominated by bureaucratic 
rivalries, the rhetoric of "national interest," and the pressures of inter-
est groups, Congress, and the press, is applied to the formulation of 
policy for the Middle East, the results are often particularly opaque. 8 
In contrast and in spite of its weaknesses, Teslik's portrait of the for-
mation of the anti-boycott legislation is clear and understandable. 
His extensive use of congressional documents, news reports, and in-
terviews with the debate's primary participants gives tremendous 
depth to his narrative. Congress, the Executive Branch, and Special 
Interests sho~d be read by anyone attempting to combat the 
" 'peaceful, silent remedf "9 of economic warfare; it must, however, 
be read with a discerning eye. 
8. P. 28 (footnote omitted) (quoting Quandt, l)omeslic Influences on United Stales Foreign 
Policy in the Middle East: The View From Washington, in THE MIDDLE EAST: QUEST FOR AN 
AMERICAN POLICY 263 (W. Beling ed. 1973)). 
9. P. 19 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, speaking in 1919). 
